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AIDS IN MEETING LEGAL EXPENSES*
BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN**

T HE problem of making legal services more readily available

to the
public-and particularly to people of moderate means'-seems
to be partly an economic problem. This is not to say, necessarily, that
lawyers' fees are universally too high or that people of moderate means
cannot generally "afford" legal services-although this may in fact be
true with respect to some fees and some people. Instead, this acknowledgment of the economic elements in the problem of availability of legal
services is meant primarily as a recognition that cost has much to do with
the extent to which people actually do utilize lawyers and legal services in
the solution of their problems.
Being able to afford something and actually purchasing it are quite
different matters. A man may be genuinely able to afford the price of
a will, a lawyer's fee for representation in a real estate transaction, or
the cost of legal services in one of the many other situations in which
people might beneficially make more frequent use of lawyers' knowledge
and skills. But at the same time, he may choose to spend his limited
means for something else, either because this "something else" is more
pressing or desirable than legal services, or because he regards the
"something else" as offering him more value for his money. If the cost
of a legal service in relation to the anticipated benefit from it seems
excessive in comparison with the cost and value of other possible purchases, then the potential client will forego the legal service in favor of
the thing that to him seems the better value-landscaping in preference
to estate planning, for example.
If the cost does have some significant effect on the use of lawyers'
services by people of moderate means, then it is appropriate to examine
* This article, in modified form, is one of a series of monographs being prepared under
an American Bar Foundation project on Availability of Legal Services and will be published
in book form by the American Bar Foundation. The opinions and views expressed are those
of the author alone and should not be imputed to either the American Bar Foundation or
the American Bar Association.
** Reporter to the American Bar Association Special Committee on Availability of Legal
Services and staff member of the American Bar Foundation.
1. As used here, the term "people of moderate means" refers to people who are above
the poverty level but who neither operate any form of business enterprise nor possess
sufficient money or property to have serious concern about finding ways of protecting it.
Obviously, such a category cannot be delimited precisely; indeed, it seems to overlap at
both ends with the categories that bound it. As a rough characterization, however, "people
of moderate means" might be thought of usefully, in terms of income, as those earning
between $5,000 and $15,000 a year.
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the question of cost as well as possible methods of reducing the adverse
effect of cost upon the use of lawyers' services. Such an examination
might be divided logically into three parts.
First, it would seem that one major element of the cost problem has
to do with the public's lack of knowledge about both the value and the
cost of legal services. Many people are perhaps not fully aware of the
benefits to be derived from lawyers' services, and many may seriously
overestimate the cost. Thus, attention might well be given to possible
methods of helping people to identify problems to which lawyers' services
might be beneficially applied, of causing them to appreciate the value of
lawyers' services with respect2 to such problems, and, perhaps, of dispelling
unfounded fears about cost.

Second, consideration might be given to possible methods of reducing
the cost. Of course, the problem of cost is implicit in the American system
of law and law practice. By the very nature of the common law, the ser.
vices of lawyers are essentially custom products, and possibilities for
lowering costs are limited. At the same time, measures designed to increase the efficiency of lawyers-better law office procedures, for example,
or greater use of non-lawyer personnel-might serve to effect some reduction in the cost of some legal services.
There is a third facet to cost problems. The resolution of large and
difficult legal problems will probably always be expensive, no matter
how efficient lawyers may become. And, although more efficient law practice may enable lawyers to perform routine services at lower cost, an
optimum use of even modestly priced, routine services may nevertheless
cause serious budgetary problems for many people of moderate means.
Thus, attention might also be given to various possibilities for assisting
people to meet the expense of legal services. Among such possibilities four
methods of spreading or reallocating the cost of legal services will be
discussed in this article. (1) The proposal that a successful litigant should
be able to recover his attorneys' fees from the unsuccessful party as a
cost of litigation would shift entirely to the losing litigant a burden that
now falls on both parties. (2) Legal service financing programs would
relieve the economic burden of legal services by spreading the expense
out over the client's own future earnings through loans or other timepayment arrangements, thus enabling a client with limited financial
resources to purchase services he could not otherwise afford. Legal service prepayment arrangements, included in most legal service insurance
proposals but not technically "insurance," would do much the same
2. For a discussion of some aspects of this part of the problem, see B. Christensen, Bringing Lawyers and Clients Together (Am. B. Found. Tent. Draft, 1968).
3. See ABA Comm. on Availability of Legal Services, Rep. No. 18, pt. 3 (Aug. 5-9, 1968)
(unpublished); ABA Summary of Action: House of Delegates 7-8 (Aug. 5-8, 1968).
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thing, though spreading the expense over an earning period before the
services were used. (3) Genuine insurance for legal services would
attempt to deal with the major expenses occasioned by the fortuitous
occurrence of legal catastrophes to some individuals among a larger group
of insureds by spreading such occasional major expenses of a few among
the entire group. (4) Legal service subsidies would spread the expense of
legal services, or a part of the expense, among the taxpayers or some
other subsidizing group.
I.

RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS'

FEES AS A COST OF LITIGATION

A number of writers have discussed this subject, covering much the
same ground but in different ways.' Generally they make the following
points: First, it is unjust to impose upon the party who is "in the right"
the economic burden of asserting or defending his rights against the
wrongdoer. Second, while allowing prevailing parties in law suits to
recover their attorneys' fees from the losers would probably inhibit the
bringing of frivolous claims or the raising of frivolous defenses, it would
probably not deter people with legitimate claims from bringing actions
or people with legitimate defenses from defending actions. The risk of
having to pay the opponent's legal fees would be but a minor uncertainty
added to the much greater uncertainties of litigation. Third, the allowance of attorneys' fees might well encourage the bringing of legitimate
claims and the raising of legitimate defenses by assuring the litigant who
is confident of his case that he will be made entirely whole if he wins.
Fourth, in many other countries, including both England and Canada,
the prevailing party to a lawsuit is generally allowed to recover his fees
from the loser. Fifth, attorney's fees were at one time generally allowed
as a cost of litigation in this country; the discontinuance of this practice
has been attributed variously to "historical accident," to the public's
distrust of and hostility to the legal profession in earlier days, or to the
individualism of early America and the "sporting theory of justice."
Sixth, recovery of attorneys' fees is presently allowed in this country
under certain limited circumstances, such as divorce proceedings, workmen's compensation cases, eminent domain proceedings, and even generally in Alaska, subject to the discretion of the supreme court. Seventh,
the awarding of attorneys' fees as a cost of litigation encourages the
4. E.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 Calif. L.
Rev. 792 (1966); Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 26 J. St. B. Cal. 107 (1951);
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not A Cost of Litigation?, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 75 (1963);
Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 202
(1966); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 Vand. L. Rev.
1216 (1967). But see Note, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 Yale LJ.

699 (1940).
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settlement of disputes by compromise and adjustment rather than by
litigation. And eighth, the awarding of attorneys' fees as a cost of litigation might obviate the contingent fee, with its attendant evils. Here,
attention will be focused on only the second and third of these points.
With respect to availability of legal services, the primary consideration in determining the proper allocation of the burden of attorneys' fees
between parties to litigation is the effect a given allocation will have upon
the public's use of the litigative process and, as a consequence, upon the
public's use of lawyers' services. As is the case in so many other fields of
concern to the legal profession, the data are inadequate to support any
kind of precise determination as to the effect of a particular allocation in
either encouraging or discouraging litigation. But there are a few pertinent facts that appear to possess some inferential value.
To begin with, the present American system, which generally denies to
the successful litigant any recovery of the attorneys' fees required for
the vindication of his rights, does in fact seem to inhibit the assertion of
some legitimate claims-particularly small ones.0 No one knows how
many, of course. In addition, as noted above, many other countries do
allow a successful litigant to recover his attorney's fees from the losing
party, with apparently satisfactory results.' Furthermore, recovery of
attorneys' fees is allowed in certain kinds of cases even in this country,
again with apparently satisfactory results. 7
Any attempt to determine how a rule allowing recovery of attorneys'
fees as a cost of litigation would affect the public's use of lawyers and
the litigative process requires examination of a number of relevant
factors. Such variable factors as the size or importance of the matter at
issue and the strength of the respective cases appear to be especially
significant.
The deterrent effect upon litigation of any given allocation of the
burden of attorneys' fees between the parties appears to be primarily a
function of the probable expense of the litigation and the value or importance of the matter in issue. Where the probable cost of litigation is small
in comparison with the value or importance of the matter to be litigated,
5. Professor Ehrenzweig gives a classic example from his own experience. Ehrenzwelg,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 792 (1966).
6. See Comm. Reports of Comparative Law Division, ABA Section of International and
Comparative Law 115 (1962); Baeck, Imposition of Fees of Attorney of Prevailing Party
Upon the Losing Party Under the Laws of Austria, id. at 119; Baeck, Imposition of Legal
Fees and Disbursements of Prevailing Party Upon the Losing Party-Under the Laws of
Switzerland, id. at 124; Dietz, Payment of Court Costs By the Losing Party Under the
Laws of Hungary, id. at 131; Freed, Payment of Court Costs by the Losing Party in France,
id. at 126; Schima, The Treatment of Costs and Fees of Procedure in the Austrian Law,
id. at 121; Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 Vand. L. Rev.
1216, 1223-24 (1967).
7. See Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 Vand. L. Rev.
1216, 1226-30 (1967).
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then the allocation of the burden of attorneys' fees would seem to have
little to do with whether or not the action would be brought. And this
would seem to be so regardless of whether the parties' cases were strong
or weak. Obviously, a plaintiff with a strong case would bring his action
even though he thereby risked the loss of an amount that included not
only his own attorneys' fees but also those of his opponent. Similarly, the
defendant with a strong case would make his defense rather than settle,
regardless of the allocation of the burden of attorneys' fees between the
parties.
Nor would the allocation of attorneys' fees seem to be determinative
in even weak cases where the probable cost of litigation is small in comparison with the value of importance of the matter in issue. If a party's
case is strong enough to justify risking his own attorney's fees, he would
probably be willing to risk the burden of paying his opponent's as well,
so long as the value of the matter far outweighs the probable cost. There
may be a narrow field where the allocation of attorneys' fees might have
some effect, but it would seem to be extremely small.
The allocation of the burden of attorneys' fees may have a great deal
to do with encouraging or discouraging litigation, however, where the
probable cost of litigation is large in comparison with the value or importance of the matter in issue. For when the cost of prosecuting or
defending an action is as great as the value of the matter involved, even
the winning party loses. This is so, for example, with virtually all of the
great mass of so-called small cases. It may also be so with some large
8
ones.
Significantly, the effect of the allocation in these circumstances depends
largely upon the strength of the cases of the respective parties. The plaintiff with a weak case may very well be deterred from bringing his action,
or the defendant with a weak case may be induced to settle rather than
to defend. On the other hand, the man with a strong case but one in
which the cost of litigation was large in relation to its value would be
encouraged to assert his claim, and the man with a strong defense to a
similarly uneconomic case would be encouraged to make his defense, by
the prospect of being made entirely whole if successful. Thus, the virtue
of a system allowing the winning party to recover his attorney's fees
from the unsuccessful party-and its potential contribution to the availability of legal services-is in its probable tendency to make the traditional legal process truly relevant and accessible to what must surely be
a vast number of people who have not heretofore been able to afford
representation.
The argument is sometimes made that relatively few cases can be
8. E.g., an anti-trust case, where a corporation may be forced to comply with what it
regards as an improper regulation or ruling because of the prospect of ruinously expensive

litigation.
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described in the "strong" or "weak" terms of the foregoing discussion. Of
course, disputes often involve intermediate degrees of strength or weakness, and sometimes the parties' cases are very evenly matched. But this
observation merely points up the superiority of a system which would
allow recovery of attorney's fees by the successful party. Under such a
system, effective access to the courts would not depend solely upon the
economic value of the matter in issue or upon the relationship between
that economic value and the probable cost of litigation, but rather upon
the party's own evaluation of, and faith in, the merits of his case. The
present American system says to the man with a small case: "Regardless
of the merits of your cause, you cannot have justice because your case
is not worth it." A system allowing recovery of attorneys' fees would
say: "If you really believe in your cause-enough to assume the risk of
paying your opponent's attorney's fees if you lose-then you can have
justice regardless of how small your case is." The latter seems vastly
superior.
II.

LEGAL SERVICE FINANCING PROGRAMS

An entirely different kind of reallocation of the burden of legal expenses is involved in the legal service financing programs now becoming
so popular with the bar.9 Many such programs are springing up around
the country. They vary in detail, but all employ the familiar time payment principle.
Typically, an agreement is entered into between a local bar association
and a bank or other lending institution. Under it, the lending agency
agrees to grant installment loans at specified rates to qualified clients
for the payment of lawyers' fees. Thus, instead of attempting to shift the
burden of legal expenses to someone other than the person using the legal
services, such financing programs seek to spread it out over an extended
segment of the user's own earnings. Consequently, many people can, in
theory at least, afford legal services that they would not be able to
purchase if they had to pay the entire fee at the time the service was
received.
The questions of ethics and propriety that were at first raised against
these plans have now been substantially laid to rest,10 and the bar seems
to be accepting them enthusiastically."' There remains, however, a ques.
tion that is essential from the standpoint of availability of legal services:
Will legal service financing programs in fact cause significant numbers
9. For a description of the pioneer program, see B. Ass'n of Erie County Legal Service
Financing Plan, ABA Award of Merit Summary 10 (1965).
10. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 320 (1968).
11. See ABA, Coordinator, Dec., 1965, at 1, col. 2. See also Stolz, Insurance for Legal
Services: A Preliminary Study of Feasibility, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417, 468 n.125 (1968);
Traycik & McKenzie, Bank Financing of Attorney Fees, 44 Mich. St. B.J. 15 (Dec.
1965).
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of people to use lawyers' services who would not otherwise have done
so?
While such programs may be of benefit to both lawyers and clients in
a number of ways, they come with serious limitations built in. To begin
with, legal expense financing is available only to qualified clientsthose with good credit ratings and good prospects of repayment. Thus,
they exclude at the outset many of the clients and potential clients who
most need help in meeting legal expenses. Moreover, because most programs contemplate only modest publicity, much of the financing will be
done, in the immediate future at least, for people who have already sought
out a lawyer.
It may be that the availability of financing will one day become a
matter of such common knowledge that people will go to lawyers' offices
with the expectation that the fees will be financed much as they are
when shopping for television sets. But for now, and for a good while
in the future, it is likely that legal service financing will be used mainly
by people who would have taken their problems to lawyers anyway.
One further limitation is of some importance. Legal services must
compete with a potential client's other needs and desires for a share of
his limited financial resources. This is so with respect to his future earnings no less than with his current income. The extent to which a man may
be willing to encumber future income in order to purchase legal services
in preference to other services or goods is limited. Thus, even the person
who does have a good credit rating and good prospects of repayment may
opt for a television set instead of estate planning, even though the latter
becomes as easily financed as the former. The main value of legal service
financing, it would seem, is that it gives him at least the same opportunity
to choose estate planning.
III. LEGAL EXPENSE INSURANCE PROPOSALS'

2

The marked success of medical insurance has prompted many lawyers
to speculate about the feasibility of some kind of insurance for legal
services.' " Such speculation has been founded generally on the assumption that similarities between legal services and medical services make the
medical insurance experience a relevant model for a legal expense insurance program. On the other hand, some critics, pointing out important
12. The definitive work on the subject is the preliminary feasibility study by Professor
Preble Stolz of the University of California School of Law. Stolz, supra note 11. It was
done under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation as an adjunct to the Project on
Availability of Legal Services and at the request of the American Bar Association Special
Committee on Availability of Legal Services. This careful study made use of the best
available actuarial advice. Much of the following brief discussion derives from it.
13. E.g., Brown, Legal-Cost Insurance, 1952 Ins. L.J. 475; Sonnenberg, Why Not Blue
Scales for Legal Services?, 22 Milw. B. Ass'n Gavel 12 (Mlarch 1961).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3 7

differences between medical and legal services, have expressed
serious
14
doubt about the feasibility of insurance for legal expenses.
Most proposals for legal expense insurance contemplate spreading the
burden of legal expenses in two ways, only one of which involves genuine
insurance principles. Under orthodox theory, insurance spreads among all
members of an insured group the burden of substantial losses incurred
fortuitously by only a few members of the group. Although the loss
occurs randomly among group members, its incidence in the group as a
whole is predictable. Thus, pure insurance for legal services would be
limited to major legal expenses that might be expected to be incurred
by only a relatively small number of insureds in any given period-such
expenses, for example, as those arising out of a serious criminal charge,
a negligence suit, a divorce, or the like.
However, most legal expense insurance proposals include, as well, many
lower cost services that are, or might be, used frequently by nearly
everyone covered by the program. These services include such things as
the preparing of simple legal instruments and the giving of routine legal
advice. Indeed, one of the arguments most commonly made in favor
of legal expense insurance is that it may encourage people of moderate
means to seek legal help and advice before their problems have become so serious as to require expensive remedial action. Coverage for
such services is clearly not insurance in the true sense. Rather, it is
in the nature of budgeting or prepayment of anticipated expenses. It
spreads the burden over the insured's own earnings for a period of time
before the services are used, much like loan or time payment plans
spread it over the client's earnings for a period of time after the services
have been used.
The combining of both insurance and budgeting elements in one socalled "insurance" program is not novel. Although perhaps predominantly
insurance in character at its inception, medical insurance has now come
to include a substantial budgeting element, with some programs now
covering routine visits to a doctor's office. Even automobile insurance,
which is viewed by many people as true insurance, seems to be more
nearly budgeting than insurance in its coverage of glass breakage and
the like.
Although they do so differently, both insurance and budgeting elements
contribute to what is probably the greatest problem associated with legal
expense insurance-marketability. In the case of the insurance element,
many of the major legal expenses that might be included in an insurance
program are already handled in other reasonably satisfactory ways. For
example, the cost of defending negligence actions is included in regular
14.

E.g., Enersen, Group Legal Services, 35 J. St. B. Cal. 11 (1960).
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casualty insurance policies and the cost of prosecuting negligence actions
is dealt with by means of the contingent fee. Other major legal expenses
involve problems which most people would find so difficult to imagine
happening to them that they would not see any need to cover them by
insurance. The expense of defending oneself against serious criminal
charges-perhaps excepting those resulting from the operation of automobiles-is probably of this type. Divorce, another common major
legal expense, involves a remedy against which a substantial number of
people have moral or religious scruples. The person whose beliefs preclude his use of a particular legal service or make his use of the service
unlikely is not apt to be enthusiastic about assuming part of the burden
of another's use of it. As a result of such problems, it becomes difficult
to find enough suitable major legal expenses to make a really attractive
insurance package from the marketing standpoint.
The problem with the budgeting element is perhaps equally troublesome. Few people who now do go to lawyers for low cost, high frequency
legal services really have trouble paying for them. Thus, for these clients,
a prepayment scheme fills no urgent need. The budgeting element of legal
expense insurance proposals is therefore actually directed at people who
do not now consult lawyers for help and advice in small or routine matters. The theory seems to be that people will make greater use of legal
services if those services are already paid for. However, it comes up
squarely against the marketing problem: How can people be induced to
pay in advance for legal services that they cannot now be induced even
to use?
Advertising may be part of the answer. Perhaps it would be possible
to do vastly more to "sell" legal services through the advertising of legal
expense insurance than it has ever been possible to do in "selling" them
directly. Even so, legal expense insurance still does not appear as a
highly attractive "package" for purposes of marketing.
If legal expense insurance is salable at all, it will probably be on a
group basis. Although in this event, such insurance would have to compete with other group benefit programs, there may be reason to hope
that it would be marketable to groups when it might not be marketable
to individuals. In union contract negotiations, employers, because of
their special interest in sustaining the productivity of employees, might
well be receptive to an insurance program that would relieve employees
of the burden of major legal expenses when such expenses do occur and
that would encourage employees to have their minor legal problems taken
care of before they become serious. With interests generally embracing
the welfare of their members, unions also might be receptive to programs
that offer genuine benefits even though the members might not have purchased the same benefits individually.
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Legal expense insurance would have to compete as well with other
possible group methods of obtaining legal services. Group legal services,
for example,' 5 would seem to have an advantage over insurance inasmuch as the group can select lawyers who are experts in the fields of law
which concern group members and can assist in bringing lawyers and
group members together. Insurance, on the other hand, is an attractive
alternative because it would preserve for the individual his free choice of
attorneys and because it would relieve the group of the burden of administering a legal services program.
The marketing of legal expense insurance on a group basis may also be
responsive to another of the problems of such insurance, adverse selection. In the absence of controls of some sort, any kind of legal expense
insurance would, of course, be purchased most readily by those who were
likely soon to be claimants. Obviously, a program that insures a disproportionately large number of people who already have or soon will have
claims is in a doubtful economic position. Most insurance programs have
adopted restrictions to control their exposure to risk. Life insurance companies, for instance, typically either reject applications from prospective
insureds who are deemed unacceptably high risks or accept them at
higher premium rates than standard. Similar controls are used in medical
and automobile insurance. In addition, another kind of restriction is also
used in medical insurance to deal with adverse selection; insureds become
eligible for certain benefits-obstetrical benefits are the most common
example-only after a specified waiting period. However, knowledge of
behavior and causation does not yet appear adequate to permit the identification of those individual prospective insureds who present high risks
of legal expense insurance claims. And there are no neatly defined gestation periods for most legal problems. Thus, these controls are not at
present feasible for legal expense insurance. Instead, adverse selection
would probably best be handled, at least at the outset, by marketing such
insurance on a group basis rather than individually, controlling the
incidence of claims through selection of the group to be insured. While it
may not be possible to predict whether individual applicants will be
acceptable insurance risks, it should be possible to predict generally that
the incidence of legal problems among the members of a group with
fairly stable characteristics, such as a labor union, will be within acceptable limits for insurance purposes.
Another problem is the possibility of abuse or over-use of insurance
benefits. Under orthodox insurance doctrine, abuse occurs whenever an
insurance benefit is utilized to secure or pay for a service that would not
have been used by the insured except for the insurance benefit. Obviously,
15. See Christensen, Group Legal Services (Am. B. Found Tent. Draft, 1967); Group
Legal Services, 39 J. St. B. Cal. 639 (1964).
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abuse tends to raise the amount that must be paid out in claims and, in
turn, the price of the insurance. Legal expense insurance would appear
to be especially susceptible to this kind of abuse. There are two reasons.
First, one objective of such insurance, at least with respect to small and
routine legal problems, is to encourage the use of lawyers' services. But
here the problem is not serious, as the principles involved are budgeting
principles and not insurance principles. Thus, presumably, all insureds
could make the fullest possible use of covered minor and routine services
-within the limits budgeted for-without in any way impairing the program's economic integrity. The second reason is that many of the major
problems that might be included in an insurance program are not really
fortuitous in their occurrence. Indeed, their occurrence is to one degree
or another within the control of the insureds. While it is unlikely that
many people would commit crimes, obtain divorces, or adopt children
merely because the legal fees were covered by insurance, the availability
of an insurance benefit might induce a good many people to utilize a
service like estate planning when they would not have done so in the
absence of insurance. While it may be desirable to encourage people to
make greater use of such "optional" legal services, their inclusion in an
insurance scheme without adequate controls would probably result in the
insurance being priced too high to be marketable.
The problem is compounded by the further fact that the amount of
legal service to be devoted to a given problem is largely within the
control of the client and the lawyer, both of whom have an interest in
the lawyer's devoting as much time and effort to the case as possible.
Moreover, the amount of service that might be devoted to a problem is
highly elastic. Thus, if insurance were to provide what was in effect a
blank check for legal services, the tendency in many cases might be to
abuse the insurance benefit by the application of a greater amount of
time and effort than the cases would otherwise justify.
There are a number of possible approaches to the problem of over-use
of insurance benefits. One is to limit the benefits offered, excluding those
that present the greatest danger of abuse. Another possibility is to adopt
a set schedule of fees for specific services, thus removing at least part
of the lawyer's incentive to provide more service than the case requires. This approach would take some of the elasticity out of the cost
of insurance benefits, but it would also leave insureds only partly protected in extraordinary cases where the legal services that were legitimately required exceeded what would be covered by the set fees. In
addition, of course, there is the difficulty of formulating any set fee
schedule as well as the virtual certainty that any system of set fees would
be unacceptable to the bar.
Still another approach is the device of co-insurance, under which the
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insured remains obligated to pay a significant portion of the expense-the
first one hundred dollars, for example, or a percentage. Co-insurance does
seem to be a workable control, although it is by no means a complete one.
Indeed, effect in limiting over-use of benefits seems to correspond roughly
to the extent to which it leaves the burden of legal expenses on the insured. Still, a middle ground may be reached where insurance might provide adequate protection while permitting useful and significant coverage,
much as do major medical insurance policies.
This sketch of the principles and problems of legal expense insurance
should serve to suggest something of the difficulties to be expected in any
attempt to develop a workable insurance system. But the problems do
not appear insurmountable. A thorough preliminary study has concluded
that a system of legal expense insurance has reasonable prospects of
proving feasible, despite the problems.' 0 In response, the American Bar
Association, upon the recommendation of its Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services, has undertaken to sponsor an experimental
program that should eventually provide a definitive answer to the question of feasibility.' 7 Legal expense insurance may never be a complete
solution to the problem of the cost of legal services. If it does prove
workable, however, it should be a significant help in making legal services
available to those people who need them.
IV. LEGAL SERVICE SuBSInIsS
The proposal that public funds be used to assist people to meet legal
expenses contemplates spreading the burden among the taxpaying public.
This discussion will review two main proposals for doing so. The first is
an indirect subsidy: Taxpayers would be allowed to claim personal legal
expenses as deductions in the computation of income taxes. The second
is a direct subsidy of the type embodied in the English Legal Aid and
Advice Schemes.
A. Income Tax Deductions for Legal Expenses
It is sometimes suggested that people might be encouraged to use
lawyers' services by a modification of the income tax laws to permit
individuals to claim deductions for personal legal expenses, much as individuals now may with medical expenses'" and as businesses now do with
legal expenses classifiable as business expenses.' This, of course, is simply
16. Stolz, supra note 11, at 476.
17. See ABA Resolution of the Board of Governors, Prepaid Legal Cost Insurance Pilot
Experiment, Oct. 8, 1968; ABA, Summary of Action: House of Delegates 3 (Feb. 19-20,
1968) ; Goldberg, Report to the [ABA] Board of Governors in re Prepaid Legal Services Pilot
Project, Oct. 17, 1968.
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213.
19. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162.
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a form of subsidy, seeking to spread among all taxpayers-in the form of
higher taxes to compensate for the loss of revenue to the governmentthat portion of an individual's legal expenses represented by the actual
tax saving from the deduction.
Such deductions may afford people some help in meeting legal expenses,
but they involve three problems. First, there is the political problem of
getting such legislation enacted. Second, tax deductions for legal expenses
would tend to give the greatest benefit to those who need it least, and the
least benefit to those who need it most. And third, there may be some
question about the real effectiveness of such a device either in relieving
people of moderate means of the burden of legal expenses or as an incentive to the use of lawyers' services.
The history of the medical expense deduction does not shed much light
on the political problem. In 1942, the demands of a world war made
necessary substantial increases in federal income taxes. The medical
expense deduction appears to have been offered and adopted as a means
of mitigating this increased tax burden for individuals.20 The proposed
medical expense provision allowed extraordinary expenses to be deducted
from individual income subject to taxation---"extraordinary" being defined as those expenses in excess of an amount (expressed as a percentage
of income) regarded as normal and routine for medical expenses. Among
witnesses appearing before Congressional committees to support the
medical expense deduction were the Tax Advisor to the Secretary of the
Treasury and representatives of the Teachers' Union of the City of New
York, the National Lawyers' Guild, the National Association of Retail
Druggists, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The gist of
their testimony was that a person who incurs an extraordinary burden
of medical expenses during a given year should be relieved of a part of
the burden of increased wartime taxes for that year.2 '
One might only guess about the reception Congress would give to a
bill providing for a legal expense deduction, or about the sources of support for such legislation. As high wartime taxes have become more or less
permanent, the same argument that supported the medical deduction
would appear to be applicable to a legal expense deduction. Moreover,
the legal expense deduction would surely present far less of a political
problem than would a proposal for a comprehensive subsidy system. On
the other hand, the use of tax laws to accomplish special ends not related
to the collection of revenue-particularly through tax-avoidance measures
20. Hearings on HR. 7378 [Revenue Revision of 1942] Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1612 (1942).
21. Id. at 1611-23, 2042-43, 2115-20, 2200-06, 2304-08; Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1676-78 (1942).
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that amount to subsidies for special interests-seems today to be meeting
with increasing disfavor.
One characteristic of tax deductions is that their benefit to the taxpayer
is proportional to the tax rate. One hundred dollars of deductible legal
expense would save a taxpayer in the lowest tax bracket $15.40 in federal
income taxes under present rates. 2 The same one hundred dollars of
legal expense would save the taxpayer in the 55% bracket $60 .50.21 It
might be argued that $15.20 would be more significant to the man with
a low income than $60.50 would be to the high income person. Still, this
kind of graduated subsidy would seem to be less than ideal as a method
of assisting persons of moderate means to pay legal expenses because it
would give comparatively little help to those who need it most. Furthermore, the same reasoning suggests that, as a practical matter, a tax
deduction would offer only slight incentive toward increased utilization
of lawyers' services by people of moderate means. It seems unlikely that
many people presently give a great deal of consideration to the presence
of tax deductibility in deciding whether or not to seek medical services.
Little reason exists for believing that it would be otherwise with legal
expenses. A man will not ordinarily spend $100 for services he doesn't
think he needs merely to get a $15 tax saving. Thus, although a leg.
expense tax deduction might be of some value in assisting people to pay
for legal services, there are serious limitations on the help it could offer.
An outright subsidy system would seem to be far more promising.
B. Direct Legal Service Subsidies
Perhaps the best example of an outright subsidy is the Legal Aid and
Advice Schemes that have been in operation in England and Wales since
1949.' This program is funded by the British government but administered by The Law Society, the national organization of solicitors.
The system presently consists of three parts: the Statutory Advice
Scheme, the Voluntary Advice Scheme, and the Statutory Assistance
Scheme.
Under the Statutory Advice Scheme, an eligible applicant is entitled
to obtain up to half an hour of consultation and advice from a participating solicitor of his own choice either without charge or for a minimal
22.

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1.
24. The Legal Aid and Advice Schemes (the term "scheme" carries no unsavory connotations in Great Britain) have been described by a number of commentators. E.g., Q. Johnstone & D. Hopson, Lawyers and Their Work 508-21 (1967); Parker, The Development of
Legal Aid in England Since 1949, 48 A.BA.J. 1029 (1962); Pelletier, English Legal Aid:
The Successful Experiment in Judicare, 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 10 (1967); Utton, The British
Legal Aid System, 76 Yale L.J. 371 (1966).
23.
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fee.25 All fees paid are added to a governmentally-subsidized Legal Aid
Fund, from which the solicitor is compensated at the rate of one pound
26
($2.40) for a half hour advice session..
The Voluntary Advice Scheme is a supplementary program offered by
the solicitors participating in the Statutory Schemes. Under it, any
person, regardless of his means, may obtain half an hour of consultation
and advice for a fee of one pound.2 7 The solicitor keeps this fee which, of
course, is the same as the compensation solicitors receive from the Legal
Aid Fund for advice given to clients who qualify under the Statutory
Advice Scheme.
Legal services beyond an initial half hour of advice are covered by the
Statutory Legal Assistance Scheme. A person is eligible for legal aid
under this program if his means are below specified levels. " In addition,
he must satisfy a committee of local solicitors that he has reasonable
grounds for asserting or disputing his claim or for defending or being a
party to the proceedings to which his application relates. -OAn applicant
who is thus determined to be eligible for legal aid is then entitled to obtain the services of a solicitor of his own choosing and, where necessary
for the trial of a case, a barrister. The statute provides specifically that
the relationship between the solicitor or barrister and his legal aid client
is to be precisely the same as with other clients. 0
A person receiving legal aid may be required to contribute to the
Legal Aid Fund in accordance with his means. 3' In matters not involv25. An applicant who is receiving National Assitance (welfare) pays nothing; one
whose disposable capital does not exceed 125 pounds ($300) and whose disposable income
is less than 7 pounds 10 shillings ($18) per week pays only 2/6d (30 cents) for the half
hour of advice. Capital considered "disposable" for this purpose is for the most part property in excess of the applicant's dwelling, furniture, clothing, tools and a limited amount of
other property. Disposable income is income in excess of a specified sum, the amount depending upon the number of dependents the applicant must support and upon other relevant
factors. Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 7(8) ; Stat. Instr. 1959,
No. 47, as amended, Stat. Instr. 1966, No. 729.
26. Id.
27. See Pelletier, supra note 24, at 23. See also Matthews, Lawyer Referral-The English
Equivalent, The Lawyer Referral Bull. 2 (Jan. 1963).
28. To be eligible, an applicant's disposable income must not exceed 700 pounds ($1,680)
a year nor his disposable capital exceed 500 pounds ($1,200). Legal Aid and Advice Act of
1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 2, as amended, Legal Aid Act of 1960, S & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 28,
§ 1. See also Stat. Instr. 1962, No. 148, as amended, Stat. Instr. 1962, No. 1714 and Stat.
Instr. 1964, No. 1893.
29. Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 1(6).
30. Id. § 1(7).
31. The recipient of legal aid may be required to contribute a sum not more than onethird of the amount by which his disposable income exceeds 250 pounds ($600) a year and
the amount by which his disposable capital exceeds 125 pounds ($300)-not exceeding, of
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ing litigation, however, legal aid is available only to those applicants
whose resources are below the levels set for requiring contribution to the
Legal Aid Fund. 2 Again, the solicitors and barristers providing services
under the Legal Aid Act are compensated from the Legal Aid Fund,
generally for ninety per cent of the fees allowed by court or, for some
services, according to a set schedule."3 Virtually the entire legal profession participates in the Legal Aid and Advice Schemes. 4 Furthermore,
because the Schemes cover a large portion of the population," a substantial amount of the work now being done by English lawyers is done
under the Legal Aid and Advice Schemes. 0
Most of the commentary on the Legal Aid and Advice Schemes expresses general satisfaction with the results.3 7 There have been complaints, however, the most significant of which are treated in a recent
memorandum from the Council of The Law Society.' Much of this
criticism is directed at the Advice Schemes and concerns two main problems. First, experience seems to have demonstrated that the posting of
panels of participating lawyers and other forms of rather passive publicity are not adequate methods of reaching all who need legal help. This
would appear especially to be so with respect to the people who most
course, the amount that the Fund may have paid out on his account. Id. § 3, as amended,
Legal Aid Act of 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 28, § 1.
32. Id. § 5, as amended, Legal Aid Act of 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 28, § 1(2). Thus, it
would appear that a person whose disposable income was below 250 pounds a year or whose

disposable capital was below 125 pounds would be eligible for legal aid both in matters Involving litigation and in those not involving litigation, while he would not be required to
make any contribution to the fund. A person whose resources were above those levels but
below 700 pounds a year of disposable income and 500 pounds of disposable capital would
be ineligible for legal aid in matters not involving litigation; in matters involving litigation,
he would be eligible for legal aid but would also be liable for a contribution. A person whose
disposable income exceeded 700 pounds a year and whose disposable capital exceeded 500
pounds would be ineligible for legal aid of any kind.
33. Id. §§ 6(5), (6), sched. 3, as amended, Legal Aid Act of 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 28, § 2.
See also Stat. Instr. 1962, No. 148, § 19, sched. 2.
34. Matthews, supra note 27; cf. Pelletier, supra note 24, at 38, estimating the participation of the profession at approximately two-thirds.
35. It has been estimated that three-quarters of the English people come within present
eligibility standards. Pelletier, supra note 24, at 31 n.82.
36. Some 119,815 applications for legal aid were granted, and advice was given to
another 63,196 people, under the Statutory Schemes in 1966-67. See The Law Society,
Annual Report of the Council and Accounts 194-95 (1966-67). The Law Society estimates that about half of the serious cases brought are assisted under the Scheme. The Law
Society, Legal Aid and Advice-Fourteenth Report and Comments and Recommendations of
the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee 2 (1963-64).
37. E.g., Matthews, supra note 27; Parker, supra note 24; The Law Society, Annual
Report of the Council and Accounts 31-33 (1966-67).
38. The Law Society, Legal Advice and Assistance-Memorandum of the Council of The
Law Society (Feb. 1968).
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need the advice-those who do not know a lawyer and who have no way
of selecting among them. The second problem has to do with the compensation set for advice rendered under the Schemes. One pound is no
longer adequate to compensate the solicitor for half an hour of his
time. As a result, solicitors are becoming increasingly reluctant to give
legal advice under the program. Still another problem has to do with
minor services rendered in small matters not involving litigation. Solicitors
are finding that helping clients to fill out the applications for legal aid
and to establish their eligibility is so time-consuming that the rendition
of legal aid services in small matters is unprofitable.
Variations of the English Legal Aid and Advice Schemes are now in
operation in some other countries.39 In the United States, the subsidy
approach has been utilized primarily as one method of compensating
assigned counsel in criminal cases under the Criminal Justice Act of
196440 and in a few limited "Judicare" experiments funded under the
Legal Services program of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity.4 1
These Judicare programs operate generally in rural areas where indigent
persons may obtain the services of practicing lawyers of their own
choice, with the fees being paid out of governmentally-provided funds.
Both the subsidy approach under the Criminal Justice Act and the experimental Judicare programs differ most significantly from the English
Legal Aid and Advice Schemes in being limited solely to the indigent
and in making no provision for any contribution by the recipient of the
services. In addition, the Criminal Justice Act arrangement does not
contemplate the defendant choosing his own lawyer.
The Judicare experiments have sometimes been opposed by American
legal aid authorities on the grounds that private practitioners will notor will not be able to-handle the peculiar problems of poor people as
well as those problems are handled by career legal aid lawyers, that
Judicare is not well adapted to the realization of such goals as law reform, and that the Judicare system cannot do an effective job of bringing lawyers and poor clients together.' On the other hand, where the
39. These include systems in Ontario, Canada, Martin, Legal Aid in Ontario, 10 Can.
B.J. 473 (1967); Parker, Legal Aid-Canadian Style, 14 Wayne L. Rev. 471 (1968);
Silverstein, The New Ontario Legal Aid System and Its Significance for the United States,
25 Legal Aid Briefcase 83 (1967), and in Hong Kong and Scotland, Pelletier, supra note
24, at 44.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
41. See Preloznik, Wisconsin Judicare, 25 Legal Aid Briefcase 91 (1967); Schlossberg &
Weinberg, The Role of Judicare in the American Legal System, 54 A.BAJ. 1000 (1968).
42. E.g., Bamberger, Legal Aid: An Opportunity for the American Bar, 42 N.D.L. Rev.
287, 291 (1966); Johnson, An Analysis of the OEO Legal Services Program, 38 Miss. L..

419, 428 (1967); Marsh, Neighborhood Law Offices or Judicare?, 25 Legal Aid Briefcase 12
(1966); National Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n, Summary of Conference Proceedings 113
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only alternative to a Judicare subsidy system appears to be an institutionalized salaried lawyer system, many local bar groups seem to favor
the subsidy, at least when limited solely to services for the indigent.4a
Many reasons are given for rejecting the English comprehensive subsidy system for use in the United States. It has been contended that the
American Bar is too large and heterogeneous for the administration of
such a program. It is sometimes argued as well that the American people are more contentious and litigious than the English, and that the
total cost of such a program would therefore be excessive. There are
also those who contend that such a system would be unacceptable to
the American people because of political ideology. And finally, many
lawyers are concerned that a subsidy system would result in the "socialization of the legal profession." A few observers, however, appear to
favor adoption of a subsidy system similiar to the English Legal Aid and
Advice Schemes.

44

From the standpoint of availability of lawyers' services, there can be
little doubt about the efficacy of a subsidy system. The English experience demonstrates clearly that cost is a major factor in the demand for
lawyers' services and that a subsidy will do much to increase the public's
utilization of such services.4 5 The issue, of course, may be resolved by
weighing this obvious value against those objections that may be implicit
in a subsidy system.
Some of the objections to a subsidy system seem to be of relatively
little weight. For example, the claim that the American public is more
litigious than the English appears to be somewhat frivolous. There may
be some truth in the generalization, of course, but one cannot help but
wonder whether differences in temperament between the two peoples are
all that great or significant. While problems of administration might be
substantially more difficult for the American bar, they would not appear
to be insurmountable and should not preclude institution of a subsidy
system if it were to be found otherwise acceptable.
Similarly, problems of bringing lawyers and clients together would not
appear insurmountable. There is no real reason why methods could not
(1966). See also Masotti & Corsi, Legal Assistance for the Poor: An Analysis and Evaluation of Two Programs, 44 J. Urban L. 483 (1967).
43. E.g., Preloznik, supra note 41. See also Frankel, Experiments in Serving the Indigent, 51 A.B.A.J. 460 (1965).
44. E.g., Pelletier, supra note 24, at 42-44; Silverstein, supra note 39, at 89-90.
45. It is estimated, for example, that litigation has increased by seventy-five per cent
since the Legal Aid and Advice Schemes were inaugurated, although it is impossible to tell
just how much of that increase is attributable to the Schemes. See, Pelletier, supra note 24,
at 39. In sixteen years, some 1,125,010 applications for legal aid were received, of which
831,664 were granted. The Law Society, Legal Aid and Advice-Sixteenth Report and Comments and Recommendations of the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee 27 (1965-66),
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be found to enable a subsidy program to reach people who have problems just as effectively as do institutionalized programs. And, while the
claimed inability of private lawyers to deal adequately with the peculiar
problems of the poor may be a legitimate objection to a subsidy system
limited to the poor, there may be some reason to hope that a subsidy
system covering a substantial portion of the entire population might result in the development of practitioners expert in the kinds of problems
of most concern to the poor. This hope stems from the possibility that a
comprehensive subsidy system might, by making practice among the
poor and among people of moderate meaus economically feasible, stimulate specialized practice along substantive lines. Thus, for example, a
subsidy system might make it possible for private lawyers to specialize
profitably in consumer credit problems, drawing clients from among all
segments of the population having such problems. And law reform might
well be one result.
The other two main objections are perhaps more serious. The problem
of political ideology is especially difficult because the American electorate is far more sharply divided than the English on the question of the
proper role of government in the affairs of citizens. Sentiment favoring
an essentially passive role is still very strong in this country and may be
expected to constitute a major obstacle to adoption of any comprehensive subsidy system. It is true that political sentiments change, and that
many governmental activities now almost universally accepted were at
one time vigorously opposed as outside the government's proper sphere.4 0
Where this has happened, the benefits to the public from such activities
have come to be seen as justifying the resultant enlargement of the role
of government. A comprehensive legal service subsidy may one day become similarly acceptable. But for now, political ideology will surely be
a major deterrent to acceptance of any "American Legal Aid and Advice
Scheme."
The fear of "socialization of the legal profession" is likewise a serious
consideration. It is interesting, however, that the English legal profession
views the Legal Aid and Advice Schemes as a means of avoiding "socialization." 47 The Law Society, seeing the nationalization of medical care
and anticipating a similar development with respect to legal services,
took the initiative by formulating its own plan for comprehensive legal
services. 48 In so doing, the English legal profession was able to secure
adoption of a program that leaves direction and control substantially in
the hands of the profession itself.4 ' To be sure, the subsidy comes from
46.

Social security, for example.

47.

See Parker, supra note 24, at 1030, 1033.

48. Id.
49. Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, §§ S-14.
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the government, substantive changes in the program require legislative
ratification, and, of course, The Law Society must report periodically to
Parliament on its administration of the program. Still, both the effective
direction of the program and its actual administration remain with the
legal profession. It may be doubtful whether the American legal profession could secure adoption of a government subsidy program leaving
such a high degree of control with the profession, even by means of such
timely action as that taken by The Law Society. Without the retention
of control by the profession, there is perhaps good cause to fear that a
subsidy system would cause a large part of the bar to become mere
employees of a government bureaucracy.
Underlying the various objections to legal service subsidies is a notion
that the economic burden of litigation should rightly fall on those who
use the litigative process. This notion has been accompanied by a fear
that giving the poor man the same options as the rich man with respect
to litigation would swamp the courts in frivolous cases. These two ideas
have also been responsible for much of the resistance over the years to
the concept of free legal aid for the poor, as well as for the resistance to
measures for relieving poor litigants of the burden of ordinary court
costs. However, individualistic notions about the burden of the cost of
litigation require a closer look. Lawyers' fees and so-called court costs
are only part of the real cost of litigation-the tip of the iceberg. Underneath lie other costs that must also be considered as costs of litigation:
the expense of building and maintaining courthouses, of paying the salaries of judges, sheriffs, bailiffs, clerks, and reporters, of keeping records
of various kinds, and even of maintaining police forces. Why does society
thus subsidize the litigative process? The reason, manifestly, is that the
resolution of disputes through some peaceful process is essential to public order and safety. Thus it is entirely appropriate that public funds be
used to provide such a process. Moreover, because any such system must
rest ultimately upon the confidence of the people in its fairness, the equality of the justice dispensed is of basic importance. Taken to its logical conclusion, the individualistic notion that it is somehow wrong to have the
costs of litigation paid by anyone but the litigants would mean that all
the costs of administering justice would have to paid by the individual
parties, with the administration of justice becoming a self-supporting
enterprise. As a result, the courts would be effectively closed to all but
the very wealthy, and even they would be able to use litigation for only
the most weighty and economically important matters.
So, then, the matter comes back to the idea of "equal justice," which
must mean that disputes are resolved according to the merits of the
respective cases and not according to the power of the respective parties.
Moreover, except in Orwellian style "double-think," the concept of equal
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justice permits of no qualifying adjectives. If all litigants are to be equal
-if merits, not power, are to govern-then no litigants can be "more
equal" than others.
If merits rather than power are to govern, then either the poor man
must have the same options as the rich, or rich as well as poor should be
foreclosed from frivolous or uneconomic use of the publicly-subsidized
litigative process. Interestingly, the small claims court is in some ways
a limited-albeit not entirely successful-attempt to deny both rich and
poor the assistance of counsel in the small cases submitted to it.
The partial subsidizing of litigation through the maintenance of courts
and the litigative machinery, as well as the halting steps that have been
taken to provide legal services to the poor, are in large part a striving
by society toward the ideal of equal justice under law, a goal not yet
attained. Viewed from this perspective, and questions of political ideology aside, the essential issue with respect to legal service subsidies is a
question of allocation of resources. How much is society willing to spend
to ensure that disputes will be determined on their merits and not according to the power of the parties? How much is America willing to pay for
equal justice?
Even the English commitment is not a total one; the legal aid recipient
must still satisfy a local committee of lawyers that he has reasonable
grounds for bringing or defending his cause. And presumably, the rich
Englishman may still get into court without reasonable cause-although
he may be thrown right out again. But the English subsidy system comes
as near as any system has ever come to realizing the ideal of equal justice under law. Should a nation that prides itself on being the richest on
earth be willing to do less?
CONCLUSION

This brief survey describes, at least in a general way, some of the
measures that might be taken to assist people of moderate means to meet
legal expenses. While each of the measures discussed might have some
beneficial effect, none promises an immediate and conclusive solution to
the whole problem of legal expense. Discussion of them tends to lead,
however, toward other, perhaps more basic, questions.
This is especially so with respect to the proposal for comprehensive
legal service subsidies. Even if it were to be accepted that the concept of
equal justice under law required a comprehensive subsidy system or
some comparable method of achieving genuine equality for all people in
the adjudication of disputes, and even if such a system were ideologically
and politically acceptable, important questions would remain: Are the
legal processes that are to be subsidized really adequate and responsive
to society's problems? With respect particularly to small claims and
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minor disputes, is it justifiable for society to spend more to subsidize
litigation than the matters being litigated are worth? Does this make
any more sense for society as a whole than it does for individual litigants? Does every dispute or every claim really require full scale formal
litigation? Or might some of them be resolved satisfactorily through less
involved and less costly procedures?
There are no easy answers, of course. But it seems noteworthy that a
number of dispute-resolving and claim-deciding mechanisms are developing as alternatives to formal litigation. Some of them, indeed, are of
long standing. Administrative procedures, mediation arrangements, small
claims tribunals, ombudsmen, advice bureaus-all have arisen or are arising at least partly in response to the same economic pressures that are
producing legal service loan plans, legal expense insurance, and legal
service subsidies.
While no new procedure or institution is likely ever to eliminate
completely the problem of expense as an obstacle to equal justice, they
could perhaps reduce the problem to the point where, insurance, subsidies or similar measures might be able to deal effectively with the balance of the problem. It is therefore appropriate that the legal profession
should give attention both to the adequacy of present legal processes and
to measures for helping people to meet legal expenses. The public and
the profession alike will benefit.

